Why Europe must treat electricity as core security infrastructure
Kristian Ruby
When large parts of Berlin lost power in January, thousands of people were abruptly reminded of a fundamental truth: electricity is not simply another commodity. It is the backbone of modern society. Transport systems stalled. Telecommunications were disrupted. Businesses shut down. Public life paused.
One lesson stands out: in today’s geopolitical environment, electricity systems are strategic assets and potential targets. We have seen the dramatic consequences of this new reality in Ukraine. For nearly three years, power infrastructure has faced systematic and evolving attacks designed not merely to damage assets, but to destabilise society and weaken national defence.
Unlike Ukraine, Europe is not experiencing the threats of wartime. But we’re not in purely peaceful times either. In a new report “Battle-tested power systems”, Eurelectric has investigated how hybrid threats to energy infrastructure are increasing across the EU. Subsea cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, arson attacks on energy facilities, escalating cyber intrusions and coordinated disinformation campaigns against utilities are no longer isolated anomalies. They are part of a broader pattern of pressure on critical infrastructure.
Forecasts and scenarios for global energy supply – The gap between aspiration and reality
Hans-Wilhelm Schiffer
Challenges and strategies in operating large-scale battery storage systems using M5BAT as an example
Lucas Koltermann and Dirk Uwe Sauer
The integration of renewable energy sources such as wind and photovoltaic systems increasingly requires flexible and reliable energy storage solutions. Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are key components for stabilizing power grids, providing ancillary services such as frequency containment reserve and automatic frequency restoration reserve, and helping manage fluctuating generation and consumption. This article presents practical insights from the operation of the M5BAT research BESS, which combines different battery technologies, including lead-acid and lithium-ion batteries, in single and hybrid operation. Focus is placed on state-of-charge management, cell balancing, system efficiency, and battery aging under real operational conditions. Results demonstrate that targeted SOC windows and active balancing strategies maximize usable capacity and minimize aging, while multi-use operational scenarios improve overall system efficiency. The findings provide a basis for improving existing BESS and planning future large-scale storage projects, supporting long-term reliability, performance, and grid integration of renewable energy sources.
Techno-economic analysis of repurposing power plant infrastructure as DAC plants
Robert Sager, Nils Hendrik Petersen, Manfred Wirsum and Urs Overhoff
The new Industrial Emissions Directive and the BREF process
Kristina Juhrich
The revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive is expected to have a significant impact on the BREF process and the future setting of limit values. Whereas previously the upper value of the range had to be implemented, in future the entire range must be taken into account and the lowest achievable value determined. In addition to pollutant emissions into the various media, other aspects of the production process must also be taken into account, such as resource and energy consumption and other environmental impacts. The following article describes the most important changes and discusses how the new requirements can be dealt with.
Conversion measures for natural gas-fired steam boilers to enable the use of hydrogen while complying with NOx emissions
Michael Beyer, Thomas Schmidt, Stefan Kohn and Jeremia Schreiber
The German government is striving to make Germany climate-neutral by 2045. This includes phasing out coal-fired power generation by 2038 at the latest, ideally by 2030. After that, oil and natural gas will be phased out of electricity and heat generation. This applies equally to households and industry. The course for this is already being set in industry today. The authors have carried out theoretical studies to illustrate how an existing boiler system would have to be modified if natural gas were to be gradually replaced by hydrogen. The aim is to ensure stable operation, high efficiency and compliance with NOx emission requirements. Conversion measures for combustion plants and steam generators are presented and an assessment is given of the conditions under which conversion is more economical than a new steam boiler plant.
Development of strategies for life cycle management of steam turbines and generators in aging fossil-fired steam power plants
Pascal Decoussemaeker, Michael Binder and Paul Cooper
Many steam power plant operators are faced with the issue that, in order to support the energy transition, they are required to operate their plant longer than originally intended. To ensure continued reliable operation, it is important to update the plant asset management strategy for the remaining operating time horizon. In this paper, an overview of the main risks for the steam turbine and the generator will be provided, along with some of the methods available for monitoring and controlling those risks. The paper also discusses other risks potentially affecting aging plant that can be caused by interactions with the electricity grid, considering changes impacting grids in many countries linked to the ongoing energy transition.
IEA: World Energy Employment 2025 – Summary
International Energy Agency (IEA)
GECF Forum der Erdgas exportierenden Länder
GECF Gas Exporting Countries Forum
The year 2025 represented a pivotal moment for the global energy industry, marked by a shift away from the traditional climate agenda and a reassessment of previously dominant climate‑driven energy policies. In particular, after several years of a negative narrative, natural gas regained credibility as a reliable and sustainable energy source, increasingly recognized as one of the most effective means of meeting rapidly growing global energy demand. This policy shift culminated in the outcomes of the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Powering security: the NATO spending and energy resilience nexus
An Eurelectric position paper
Editorial
Kristian Ruby
Secretary General
Eurelectric, Brussels, Belgium
Why Europe must treat electricity as core security infrastructure
Dear readers of the vgbe energy journal,
When large parts of Berlin lost power in January, thousands of people were abruptly reminded of a fundamental truth: electricity is not simply another commodity. It is the backbone of modern society. Transport systems stalled. Telecommunications were disrupted. Businesses shut down. Public life paused.
One lesson stands out: in today’s geopolitical environment, electricity systems are strategic assets and potential targets. We have seen the dramatic consequences of this new reality in Ukraine. For nearly three years, power infrastructure has faced systematic and evolving attacks designed not merely to damage assets, but to destabilise society and weaken national defence.
Unlike Ukraine, Europe is not experiencing the threats of wartime. But we’re not in purely peaceful times either. In a new report “Battle-tested power systems”, Eurelectric has investigated how hybrid threats to energy infrastructure are increasing across the EU. Subsea cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, arson attacks on energy facilities, escalating cyber intrusions and coordinated disinformation campaigns against utilities are no longer isolated anomalies. They are part of a broader pattern of pressure on critical infrastructure.
At the same time, global energy geopolitics are shifting. Energy is increasingly framed as an instrument of power projection and political leverage. We’re abruptly coming back from a 30-year vacation from world History where stable, rules-based interdependence was a given.
For Europe, this reinforces a central conclusion: homegrown electricity – increasingly renewable, diversified and interconnected – is not only a decarbonisation pathway. It is the foundation of long-term energy security. However, as transport, heating, industry and digital infrastructures electrify, it becomes even more important to avoid incidents that would cascade across sectors. Europe needs a step-change in preparedness at three levels.
First, at company level. Utilities must embed security into core strategy and operations. This includes enhanced physical protection of critical assets, systematic crisis exercises, strengthened cybersecurity capabilities, and stockpiling of essential components such as transformers and grid equipment. Smaller operators must also be alert; hybrid actors often exploit weaker links in complex systems. A robust security culture across the entire value chain is essential.
Second, at national level. Regulation must align with the new security reality. Grid operators, for instance, can only invest within regulated frameworks. If we expect them to build redundancy, maintain strategic reserves of equipment, or establish resilient back-up communication systems to enable black-start capabilities after a large outage, regulators must allow and remunerate these investments. Security cannot be treated as an optional add-on.
Third, at EU level. Europe’s overarching energy security strategy dates back to 2014. Since then, the energy mix, the geopolitical environment and the technological architecture of the system have fundamentally changed. While important legislation has been adopted — notably in cybersecurity — we need a comprehensive, electricity-centred review of Europe’s security framework. This must integrate physical threats, cyber risks, supply chain resilience, defence considerations and cross-sector coordination.
Cybersecurity also deserves attention. As grids digitalise and distributed energy resources become more connected, the attack surface expands. Artificial intelligence enhances both defensive tools and malicious capabilities. The same data flows that enable demand response and optimise renewable integration must be secured against intrusion. Balancing digital openness with robust protection will be one of the defining challenges of the coming decade.
The overarching message of “Battle-tested power systems” is clear: electricity has become central to Europe’s security architecture. The lessons from Ukraine show both the scale of the threat and the importance of resilience, agility and coordination. The Berlin blackout shows that even in stable democracies, disruption can occur suddenly and with widespread impact.
Energy security in the age of electricity means preparing not only for market volatility, but for deliberate disruption. It means investing before crisis strikes. And it means recognising that a resilient power system is no longer just an economic necessity. It is a strategic imperative.